



A NEW ATTACKING METHOD TO SOLVETHE DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM ON ELLIPTIC CURVES

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Abstract

In this paper, we provides two propositions that give a direct computing of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm problem (ECDLP) and propose a method for the computation of discrete logarithms in the Elliptic Curve (EC) defined over finite fields. This propositions and propose method provides a new approach to the field of attacking methods of the Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems. In addition, we give a program to implement the proposed method by using MATLAB.

Introduction

Several researches were available about ECDLP related to them. For good survey one can turn to [4]. The security of modern public key cryptosystems is based in the difficulty for solving efficiently some kind of mathematical problems. Since the invention of the public key cryptography by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [1], many public key cryptosystems have been proposed, of these some have been broken and others have been demonstrated to be impractical. Today, only three type of systems are considered enough secure and efficient. Such systems are based in one of the following mathematical problems:

Integer factorization problem (IFP).

Discrete logarithm problem (DLP).

Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm problem (ECDLP).

Although non of these problems have been proved to be intractable, are

considered as intractable because years of study has failed to yield efficient algorithms to solve them. The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm problem can be defined as follows: Given an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field, a point P of order n on E , and a point Q a point in the group generated by P , determine the integer k is called the discrete logarithm of Q to the base P , denoted $k = \text{between } 0 \text{ and } n-1$ such that $Q = [k]P$, provided that such an integer exists. Based on the statement above we define Q to be the public key and k the private one. Based on intractability of this problem, Neal Koblitz [3] and Victor Miller [5] independently proposed using the group of points on an elliptic curve defined over a finite field to implement the various discrete logarithm cryptosystems. Elliptic curves have been applied to modify public key cryptosystem, such as the DSA [6].

Background on Elliptic Curves

An elliptic curve E over field is defined by an equation of the form

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b, \tag{1}$$

where $a, b \in \mathbb{F}$, such that $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$ in \mathbb{F} . The set E consists in all points $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}^2$ which satisfy equation (1), together with a special point O_∞ , called the point at the infinity.

E forms an abelian group with the addition operation defined as follow:

$$O_\infty \oplus O_\infty = O_\infty$$

$$(x, y) \oplus O_\infty = (x, y), O_\infty \text{ is the identity}$$

$$(x, y) \oplus (x, -y) = O_\infty. \text{ The inverse of one element is obtained changing the sign of the second component.}$$

To add two different elements, which are not one inverse of the other, we apply the following rule :

$$(x_1, y_1) \oplus (x_2, y_2) = (x_3, y_3)$$

$$x_3 = \lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2, \quad y_3 = (x_1 - x_3) - y_1$$

To add a point with itself, we apply the rule :

$$2(x_1, y_1) = (x_3, y_3)$$

$$x_3 = -2x_1, \quad y_3 = (x_1 - x_3) - y_1$$

The last two operations have a straight geometric interpretation. As shown in Figure (1), if $P=(x_1, y_1)$ and $Q=(x_2, y_2)$ are two distinct points over the elliptic curve, then the sum of P, Q, denoted as $R=(x_3, y_3)$, defined as follows: First draw a line through P and Q. This line intersects the EC at the third point R' . Tacking the reflection of this point about the x-axis. We obtain the point R.

To add a point $P=(x_1, y_1)$ to itself, a tangent line to the curve is drawn at the

point P. If $y_1 \neq 0$ then the tangent line intersects the curve at a second point, R' . R' is reflected to the x-axis to R. This operation is called doubling the point P as shown in Figure (2).

If a point P is such that $y_1 = 0$, then the tangent line to the EC at P is vertical and does intersect the EC at any other point. By part(5), [2] $P=O_\infty$ for such a point P as shown in Figure (3).




Figure 1: Geometric Addition of Elliptic Curve Points.




Figure 2: Geometric Doubling of Elliptic Curve Points, when $y_1 \neq 0$.




Figure 3: Geometric Doubling of Elliptic Curve Points, when $y_1 = 0$.

If $P \in E$ then we denoted as $[k]P$ the result of adding k times with himself;

$$\underbrace{P \oplus P \oplus \dots \oplus P}_{k \text{ times}}$$

and the order of P is the

smallest positive integer n such that $[n]P = O_\infty$. We denote the order of P by $\text{ord}(P)$ [2].

Inventions for Solving ECDLP

This section provides two proposition that give a direct computing of the ECDLP and anew attacking method to solve ECDLP.

Proposition (1)

Let E be an EC defined over the finite field F_p , and $P, Q \in E(F_p)$ and $\text{ord}(P) = n$, compute $R = [A]P \oplus Q$ where $A \in [2, n - 1]$ then

If $R = O_\infty$ then $\log_p Q = (n - A) \text{ mod } n$.

If $R = P$ then $\log_p Q = (1 - A) \text{ mod } n$.

If $R = \ominus P$ then $\log_p Q = (-1 - A) \text{ mod } n$.

Proof:

Since $R = [A]P \oplus Q$ then $R = [A + k]P$ and since $\text{ord}(P) = n \Rightarrow [n]P = O_\infty$. So if $R = O_\infty$ then $[A + k]P = O_\infty \Rightarrow A + k = n \Rightarrow A + k = n \text{ (mod } n) \Rightarrow k = (n - A) \text{ mod } n$.

Since $R = [A]P \oplus Q$ then $R = [A + k]P$ and since $\text{ord}(P) = n \Rightarrow [n]P = O_\infty$. So if $R = P$ then $[A + k]P = P \Rightarrow A + k = 1 \Rightarrow A + k = 1 \text{ (mod } n) \Rightarrow k = (1 - A) \text{ mod } n$.

3) Since $R = [A]P \oplus Q$ then $R = [A + k]P$ and since $\text{ord}(P) = n \Rightarrow [n]P = O_\infty$. So if $R = \ominus P$ then $[A + k]P = \ominus P \Rightarrow A + k = -1$

$$\Rightarrow A + k = -1 \text{ (mod } n)$$

$$\Rightarrow k = (-1 - A) \text{ mod } n$$

Example (1)

Consider the elliptic curve E defined over by the equation:

$$E : y^2 = x^3 + 102x + 35$$

Let $P = (100, 15) \in E$. We wish to determine the discrete logarithm of point $Q = (75, 50)$ to the base P .

Solution:

The order of P is $n = 142$.

1) Choose $A \in [2, n - 1]$, let $A = 93$ and then compute $Z = [A]P \oplus Q = [93](100, 15) \oplus (75, 50) = (75, 81) \oplus (75, 50) = O_\infty$, hence by Proposition (1.1) then $k \equiv (n - A) \text{ mod } n = (142 - 93) \text{ mod } 142 = 49 \text{ mod } 142 = 49$. Then the discrete logarithm of Q to the base P is 49.

2) Choose $A \in [2, n - 1]$, let $A = 94$ and then compute $Z = [A]P \oplus Q = [94](100, 15) \oplus (75, 50) = (99, 40) \oplus (75, 50) = (100, 15) = P$, hence by Proposition (1.1) then $k \equiv (1 - A) \text{ mod } n = (1 - 94) \text{ mod } 142 = -93 \text{ mod } 142 = 49$. Then the discrete logarithm of Q to the base P is 49.

3) Choose $A \in [2, n - 1]$, let $A = 92$ and then compute $Z = [A]P \oplus Q = [92](100, 15) \oplus (75, 50) = (68, 86) \oplus (75, 50) = (100, 116) = \ominus P$, hence by Proposition (1.3) then $k \equiv (-1 - A) \text{ mod } n = (-1 - 92) \text{ mod } 142 = -93 \text{ mod } 142 = 49$. Then the discrete logarithm of Q to the base P is 49.

Proposition (2)

Let E be an EC defined over the finite field, and $P, Q \in E$ and $\text{ord}(P) = n$, compute $R = P \oplus [B]Q$ where $B \in [2, n - 1]$ then

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If $R = O_\infty$ and $\text{gcd}(B, n) = 1$ then $\log_p Q = B^{-1} \text{ mod } n$.

If $R = Q$ and $\text{gcd}(1 - B, n) = 1$ then $\log_p Q = (1 - B)^{-1} \text{ mod } n$.

If $R = \ominus Q$ and $\text{gcd}(-1 - B, n) = 1$ then $\log_p Q = (-1 - B)^{-1} \text{ mod } n$.

Proof:

Since $R=P\oplus[B]Q$ then $R=[1+B\cdot k]P$ and since $\text{ord}(P)=n \Rightarrow [n]P=O_\infty$. So if $R=O_\infty$ then $[1+B\cdot k]P=O_\infty \Rightarrow 1+B\cdot k=n$

$$\Rightarrow 1+B\cdot k \equiv n \pmod{n}$$

$$\Rightarrow k \equiv \text{mod } n.$$

Since $R=P\oplus[B]Q$ then $R=[1+B\cdot k]P$ and since $\text{ord}(P)=n \Rightarrow [n]P=O_\infty$. So if $R=Q$ then $[1+B\cdot k]P=Q \Rightarrow [1+B\cdot k]P=[k]P$

$$\Rightarrow 1+B\cdot k = k$$

$$\Rightarrow 1+B\cdot k \equiv k \pmod{n}$$

$$\Rightarrow 1 \equiv k - B\cdot k \pmod{n}$$

$$\Rightarrow 1 \equiv k \cdot (1 - B) \pmod{n}$$

$$\Rightarrow k \equiv \text{mod } n.$$

Since $R=P\oplus[B]Q$ then $R=[1+B\cdot k]P$ and since $\text{ord}(P)=n \Rightarrow [n]P=O_\infty$. So if $R=\ominus Q$ then $[1+B\cdot k]P=\ominus Q \Rightarrow [1+B\cdot k]P=\ominus[k]P$

$$\Rightarrow 1+B\cdot k = -k$$

$$\Rightarrow 1+B\cdot k \equiv -k \pmod{n}$$

$$\Rightarrow 1 \equiv -k - B\cdot k \pmod{n}$$

$$\Rightarrow 1 \equiv k \cdot (-1 - B) \pmod{n}$$

$$\Rightarrow k \equiv \text{mod } n.$$

Proposed Method

Let $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ be an elliptic curve with generator P . Suppose that P has order n , and let $Q \in E$. Suppose that we want find k such that $Q=[k]P$. Calculate $R=P\oplus Q$. Then calculate $[d]Q$ for $1 \leq d \leq n-1$ and check these points until found a match

Also, a new proposed method for solving the ECDLP were suggested. It can be considered as a new approach to tackle the problem of attacking the ECDLP.

That is provides a reduction to

with point R . When a match is found we have solved the ECDLP as following:

$$[d]Q=R \text{ hence,}$$

$$[d]Q=P \oplus Q$$

$$[d]Q \ominus Q = P$$

$$[d-1]Q = P$$

$$Q = P.$$

Therefore, if $\text{gcd}(d-1, n)=1$, we get that $k \equiv \text{mod } n$.

Example 3

Consider the elliptic curve E defined over \mathbb{F}_{641} by the equation:

$$E : y^2 = x^3 + 3x + 44.$$

Let $P=(401, 245) \in E$. We wish to determine the discrete logarithm of point $Q=(584, 405)$ to the base P .

Solution:

The order of P is $n=647$. Firstly calculate $R=P\oplus Q=(401, 245)\oplus(584, 405)=(260, 162)$

Now, calculate $[d]Q$ for $1 \leq d \leq 647$ until we find a match with point R as following:

$$[1]Q=[1](584, 405)=(584, 405)$$

$$[2]Q=[2](584, 405)=(25, 436)$$

$$[3]Q=[3](584, 405)=(180, 240)$$

$$[4]Q=[4](584, 405)=(332, 398)$$

$$[163]Q=[163](584, 405)=(250, 360)$$

$$[164]Q=[164](584, 405)=(260, 162)$$

At this point we have a match. Hence we find that $k \equiv \text{mod } n$

mathematical operations. This leads to main conclusion that the new proposed method is better than the Exhaustive Search in the reduction cost can be offered for complexity of calculation.

The Program for computing the discrete logarithm k of point $Q=(x_2, y_2)$ to the base $P=(x_1, y_1)$ from $Q=[k]P$, where $P, Q \in E: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ defined over.

(1) % program to find secret key k

(2) $p = \text{input}(\text{'enter prime no. } p \text{'})$;

Appendix

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(3) a= input('enter integer no.a=');
(4) b = input('enter integer no.b=');
(5) x1 = input ('enter integer no. x1=');
(6) y1 = input ('enter integer no. y1=');
(7) x2 = input ('enter integer no. x2 =');
(8) y2 = input ('enter integer no. y2 =');
(9) m1=mod(y2-y1,p);
(10) m2=mod(x2-x1,p);
(11) for z=1:p-1
(12) w=mod(m2*z,p);
(13) if w==1;[z];
(14) m=mod(m1*z,p);
(15) end,end
(16) xR=mod(m^2-x1-x2,p);
(17) yR=mod(m*(x1-xR)-y1,p);
(18) R=[xR yR];
(19) for k=1:2*p
(20) r=dec2bin(k);
(21) [row,col]=size(r);
(22) xk=x1;
(23) yk=y1;
(24) for i=2:col
(25)m1=mod(3*xk^2+a,p);
(26)m2=mod(2*yk,p);
(27) for z=1:p-1
(28)w=mod(m2*z,p);
(29) if w==1;[z];m=mod(m1*z,p);
(30) end,end
(31)x3=mod(m^2-2*xk,p);
(32)y3=mod(m*(xk-x3)-yk,p);
(33)s=[x3 y3];
(34)xk=s(1);
(35)yk=s(2);
(36) if r(i)==49
(70)yd=s(2);
(71) if r(i)==49
(72)m1=mod(yd-y2,p);
(73)m2=mod(xd-x2,p);
(74) for z=1:p-1
(75)w=mod(m2*z,p);
(76) if w==1;[z];mm=mod(m1*z,p);
(37)m1=mod(yk-y1,p);
(38)m2=mod(xk-x1,p);
(39) for z=1:p-1
(40)w=mod(m2*z,p);
(41) if w==1;[z];mm=mod(m1*z,p);
(42) end,end
(43)x4=mod(mm^2-x1-xk,p);
(44)y4=mod(mm*(x1-x4)-y1,p);
(45)z=[x4 y4] ;
(46)xk=z(1);
(47)yk=z(2);
(48) end,end
(49) if xk==x1 & yk~=y1
(50)n=[k+1];break
(51) end
(52)R=[xk,yk];
(53) end
(54) for d=1:n-1
(55)r=dec2bin(d);
(56)[row,col]=size(r);
(57)xd=x2;
(58)yd=y2;
(59) for i=2:col
(60)m1=mod(3*xd^2+a,p);
(61)m2=mod(2*yd,p);
(62) for z=1:p-1
(63)w=mod(m2*z,p);
(64) if w==1;[z];m=mod(m1*z,p);
(65) end,end
(66)x3=mod(m^2-2*xd,p);
(67)y3=mod(m*(xd-x3)-yd,p);
(68)s=[x3 y3];
(69)xd=s(1);
(77) end,end
(78)x4=mod(mm^2-x2-xd,p);
(79)y4=mod(mm*(x2-x4)-y2,p);
(80)z=[x4 y4] ;
(81)xd=z(1);
(82)yd=z(2);

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(83) end,end
(84)[xd,yd];

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(85) if [xd,yd]==[xR,yR]
(86)di=d;

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(87) break
 (88) end,end
 (89)d; r=d-1;
 (90) for z=1:n-1
 (91)w=mod(r*z,n);

Example (2)

Consider the elliptic curve E defined over by the equation:

$$E: y^2 = x^3 + 102x + 35.$$

Let $P=(100,15) \in E$. We wish to determine the discrete logarithm of point $Q=(75, 50)$ to the base P.

Solution:

The order of P is $n=142$.

Choose $B \in [2, n-1]$, let $B = 113$ and then compute $Z=P \oplus [B]Q=(100,15) \oplus [113](75, 50)=(100, 15) \oplus (100,116)=O_\infty$, hence by Proposition (2.1) then $k \equiv \text{mod } n = \text{mod } 142 = \text{mod } 142 = 141 \cdot \text{mod } 142 = 141 \cdot 93 \text{ mod } 142 = 13113 \text{ mod } 142 = 49$. Then the discrete logarithm of Q to the base P is 49.

Algorithm 1

A proposed method algorithm for computing ECDLP.

INPUT: a generator P of a cyclic group E, of order n and an point Q $\in E$.

OUTPUT: the discrete logarithm k.

Conclusions

In this paper, we get two propositions that compute in E over the finite field without method but with some condition. The first proposition that starts with initial point $R=[A]P \oplus Q$ where $A \in [2, n-1]$ such that discrete logarithm of Q to the base P in E over the finite field as follows:

$$\begin{cases} \text{mod } n & \text{if } R = O_\infty \\ \text{mod } n & \text{if } R = Q \end{cases}$$

(92) if w==1; [z]; r=1*z; inversrer=r;
 (93) end,end
 (94)k = mod (inversrer,n);
 (95)secretkey = k

Choose $B \in [2, n - 1]$, let $B=114$ and then compute $Z=P \oplus [B]Q=(100,15) \oplus [114](75, 50)=(100, 15) \oplus (99, 91)=(75, 50)=Q$, hence by Proposition (2.2) then

$k \equiv \text{mod } n = \text{mod } 142 = \text{mod } 142 = \text{mod } 142 = 1 \cdot \text{mod } 142 = 1 \cdot 49 \text{ mod } 142 = 49$. Then the discrete logarithm of Q to the base P is 31.

Choose $B \in [2, n - 1]$, let $B=112$ and then compute $Z=P \oplus [16]Q=(100,15) \oplus [112](75,50)=(100,15) \oplus (68, 86)=(75,81)=\ominus Q$, hence by Proposition (2.3) then $k \equiv \text{mod } n = \text{mod } 142 = \text{mod } 142 = \text{mod } 142 = 1 \cdot \text{mod } 142 = 1 \cdot 49 \text{ mod } 142 = 49$. Then the discrete logarithm of Q to the base P is 49.

$= \text{mod } 647 = \text{mod } 647 = (1 \cdot) \text{ mod } 647 = (1 \cdot 389) \text{ mod } 647 = 389$
 Thus $k = 389$.

1. Calculate $R=P \oplus Q$.
 2. For d from 1 to $n-1$ do the following :
 - 2.1 If $R=[d]Q$ then do the following:
 - Set $r = d - 1$
 - If $\text{gcd}(r, n) = 1$
- $K = \text{mod } n$ and return k

$$\begin{cases} \text{mod } n & \text{if } R = O_\infty \\ \text{mod } n & \text{if } R = P \\ \text{mod } n & \text{if } R = \ominus P \end{cases}$$

The second proposition that starts with initial point $R=P \oplus [B]Q$ where $B \in [2, n-1]$ such that discrete logarithm of Q to the base P in E over the finite field as follows:

$$\text{mod } n \quad \text{if } R = \ominus Q$$

References

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الخلاصة:

في هذا البحث قدمنا قضيتين اللتان تعطيان حساب مباشر لمسألة اللوغاريتم المنفصل في المنحنيات الاهليلجية واقترحنا طريقة جديدة لحل مسألة اللوغاريتم المنفصل في المنحنيات الاهليلجية المعرف على الحقل المنتهي هذه النظريتين والطريقة الجديدة توفر وسيلة جديدة إلى مجال طرق مهاجمة أنظمة تشفير المنحنيات الاهليلجية. كما أعطينا في هذا البحث برنامج لتنفيذ الطريقة المقترحة باستخدام الماتلاب.